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TILE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT:
MAKING CONSUMER PRODUCT
WARRANTY A FEDERAL CASE
ROBERT C. DENICOL4*
F OR many Americans the most recent anniversary of the na-
tion's independence was little more than a prelude to the forth-
coming Bicentennial. For American businessmen, however, the 199th
anniversary was significant in its own right. On July 4, 1975, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act' went into effect, having been signed
by President Ford six months earlier. 2 A supporter has described the
Act as "one of the most important pieces of consumer protection
legislation considered by the Congress since the Federal Trade
Commission Act itself was passed in 1914."13 This characterization
should not be dismissed as mere partisan rhetoric. The Act may
indeed have a significant effect upon the respective rights and re-
sponsibilities of those who buy, sell, and manufacture consumer prod-
ucts.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act represents the first com-
prehensive attempt to deal with the problems of consumer product
warranties on the federal level. This Article will examine the provisions
of the Act, with particular emphasis on their interaction with existing
state law.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 6, 1968, President Johnson created the Task Force on
Appliance Warranties and Service. 4 The Task Force was directed to
undertake a study relating to the servicing, repair and durability of
consumer products. Its report lent strong support to those who were
pressing for new legislative initiatives in the area of consumer product
warranties and revealed widespread consumer dissatisfaction with
* Instructor, Boston University School of Law. B.S.E., 1971, Princeton University, J.D., 1974,
Harvard University.
1. Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (Title I codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-12 (Supp. 1,
1975)) [hereinafter cited as Warranty Act].
2. The Act is applicable to warranties on consumer products manufactured on or after July 4,
1975. It does not affect products manufactured prior to that date, regardless of the date of sale.
Warranty Act § 112(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2312(a) (Supp. 1, 1975).
3. 120 Cong. Rec. 21,976 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Moss).
4. See H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House
Report].
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both the content and performance of warranty obligations. 5 It con-
cluded that some warrantors did not live up to their commitments, and
that often no practical means of enforcement were available to ag-
grieved consumers. The Task Force found evidence that many
warranties were inadequately understood by consumers, and that some
were plainly deceptive. Concerning disclaimer of implied war-
ranties, the report concluded that "[v]irtually all major appliance
warranties contain provisions which purport to disclaim any liability
which might arise by virtue of the implied warranties [of] merchant-
ability and fitness for particular purposes under the Uniform Commercial
Code."'6 The report's suggestion that competitive pressures might
dissuade individual companies from voluntarily conforming to higher
warranty standards gave support to the argument that comprehensive
legislation was required. Six years elapsed, however, before the Congress
acted.
In attempting to correct the abuses enumerated by the President's
Task Force, the Act relies on three distinct mechanisms. First, it
establishes extensive warranty disclosure requirements which should
aid the consumer in evaluating the worth of the proposed warranty
prior to purchase, and insure the availability of an unambiguous listing
of the obligations undertaken by the warrantor in the event that a
dispute arises as to these responsibilities. 7 Secondly, the Act creates a
regulatory scheme directed at the actual content of written warranties.
It sets forth minimum standards which must be met before a warranty
may be designated a "full" warranty, and requires that all others be
clearly labeled as "limited" warrranties. It restricts a warrantor's
ability to condition his obligations upon the buyer's use of specified
support products," and severely curtails the right to limit or disclaim
implied warranties. 9 Finally, the Act establishes a system of formal
and informal enforcement procedures and permits an aggrieved con-
sumer to bring an action for violation of the Act in either federal or
state court. In addition, both the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission are involved in public enforcement.' 0
Each of these three facets of the Act (disclosure, content regulation
and remedial procedures) will be examined in detail, together with the
changes each has created in existing warranty law. Much of the latter
5. The President's Task Force Report on Appliance Warranties and Service, as quoted in
House Report, supra note 4, at 26-28.
6. Id. at 28.
7. See notes 24-44 infra and accompanying text.
8. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 45-88 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 90-120 infra and accompanying text.
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law is contained in Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). Our objective will be an understanding of the rights and
obligations created by the Act, and their interaction with those arising
under the UCC. The intricate, sometimes convoluted manner in which
the Warranty Act deals with existing state law makes the latter goal
particularly elusive.
11. THE SCOPE OF THE ACT-SECTION 101
Before examining the specific requirements of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, consideration should be given to its overall scope. The
statute is directed at warrantors who offer written warranties in
connection with the sale of consumer products. Significantly, oral
warranties do not fall within the purview of the Act. Although
consideration was given to the inclusion of oral warranties in some
provisions of the bill, the statute as finally enacted excluded them
entirely. I"
Section 101(6) provides the operative definition of "written war-
ranty," and the result is far from satisfactory. A "written warranty"
consists of a written statement concerning the quality or nature of the
product, or the extent of the warrantor's obligations after sale. In
either case the statement must become "part of the basis of the
bargain. 1' 2 By adopting the "basis of the bargain" formulation found
in the definition of "express warranty" contained in UCC section
2-313, the draftsmen apparently intended that the test to be used in
connection with this element of the definition be identical with that
used under the Code. Having implicity alluded to the UCC definition
of express warranty, the question arises as to whether the federal
definition in section 101(6) was meant to include all warranties that
would be classified as written express warranties under Article Two.
The UCC states that "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty .... -13 The definition of
"written warranty" in section 101(6), however, appears to introduce a
new requirement. The affirmation or promise must also include a claim
that the "material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time."14 The purpose and
effect of this additional language is unclear. A written claim by a
11. The Congress did imply that it might deal separately with such warranties if their use
"became more prevalent." S. Rep. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report].
12. Warranty Act § 101(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6) (Supp. 1, 1975).
13. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313(1)(a) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
14. Warranty Act § 101(6XA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(6)(A) (Supp. 1, 1975).
19751
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
manufacturer of lawn furniture that the product is "rust free" would give
rise to an express warranty under UCC section 2-313 if it became part of
the basis of the bargain. Would it also fulfill the "defect free" requirement
of section 101(6) and thus qualify as a "written warranty" under the Act?
If the two definitions are meant to be coextensive, the additional language
in section 101(6) is both extraneous and confusing. If the draftsmen
intended to exclude some types of written warranties under the UCC, the
dividing line is indistinct.
In order to come within the scope of the Act, the warranty must be
given in connection with the sale of a "consumer product." Section
101(1) defines such a product as "any tangible personal property which
is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes."' 5 The "distributed in commerce" re-
quirement is obviously intended to bring the Act within the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution and the inclusion of subsec-
tions 101(13) and (14) indicates that Congress intended this language to
be construed broadly. It will be a rare warrantor who can avoid the
jurisdiction of the Act. The question of whether a particular product is
"normally used" for the purposes specified in section 101(1) is to be
answered in light of the nature of the product itself, independent of its
actual use by the individual consumer: the House report on the bill
indicates that products which are in fact used for business purposes
nonetheless fall within section 101(1) if such items would generally be
used for personal, family, or household purposes. 16 Thus an au-
tomobile used in the operation of a business is still a "consumer
product" within the meaning of the Act.
Two other terms deserve mention before beginning an examination
of the obligations imposed by the Act. Although many of the statute's
provisions are directed at "warrantors," some (most notably sections
104(e) and 108) employ the term "supplier." A "supplier" is defined as
"any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product
directly or indirectly available to consumers."'1 The House report
states that the definition includes "all persons in the chain of produc-
tion and distribution of a consumer product including the producer or
manufacturer, component supplier, wholesaler, distributor, and re-
15. Id. § 101(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(1) (Supp. 1, 1975).
16. House Report, supra note 4, at 34. This approach is contrary to that taken by UCC
§ 9-109. Comment 2 to the latter section makes it clear that the principal use to which the
product is put is determinative. UCC § 2-103(3) adopts the definition for purposes of Article 2 as
well.
17. Warranty Act § 101(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(4) (Supp. 1, 1975).
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taller. 18 Persons not regularly engaged in making such products
available to consumers are not to be considered "suppliers." The original
House version of the bill provided that only a "supplier" could be
considered a "warrantor" under the Act. 19 Before passage, however, the
definition of "warrantor" was expanded in an effort to include third
parties who sometimes give warranties on consumer products, such as
certain magazines.20 The Act now defines a "warrantor" as "any supplier
or other person who gives... a written warranty or who is or may be
obligated under an implied warranty."2 1 Until the definition of"warran-
tor" was amended, it made little difference whether a particular
provision used the term "warrantor," or referred instead to a "supplier"
who gives a written warranty. Now, however, an argument can be made
that those provisions dealing with "suppliers" who give written warran-
ties have a narrower application than those directed simply at "warran-
tors." The latter provisions would cover third party warrantors while the
former would not. Quite possibly this disparity in scope was unintended.
Even under the expanded definition of "warrantor," however, one who
merely publishes or broadcasts a warranty on behalf of another should
not be treated as having given or offered a written warranty. 22 Only those
third parties who actually undertake warranty obligations themselves
should be included within the section 101(5) definition.
The term "warrantor" as defined in section 101(5) encompasses any
person liable under an implied warranty, even where no written
warranty has been offered. By virtue of section 101(7), it is state law, as
modified by sections 104(a) and 108, that determines the existence of
implied warranties. The creation of such warranties is thus governed by
UCC section 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability) and UCC
section 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness). An implied warranty of
merchantability will arise only where the seller is a "merchant." The
typical consumer products retailer, however, will fall within the UCC
definition of "merchant" as set forth in section 2-104. An implied
warranty of fitness will arise whenever the seller has reason to know that
the goods are intended for a particular purpose if he is also aware that the
customer "is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods."'2 3 Both UCC provisions provide for the exclusion or
modification of these implied warranties, but sections 104(a) and 108 of
the Act severely restrict such practices.
18. House Report, supra note 4, at 35.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 27.
21. Warranty Act § 101(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(5) (Supp. 1, 1975) (emphasis added).
22. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 27.
23. UCC § 2-315.
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
m1. THE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS-
SECTIONS 102, 106, 109(b) AND 111(c)
The importance of adequate disclosure in connection with the use of
written warranties is readily apparent. If the consumer is not fully
aware of the terms and conditions of the warranty, he will be unable
intelligently to assess its value at the time of purchase. If the buyer
does not understand his own duties and obligations, or is unaware of
the proper enforcement procedures, warranty benefits which have been
paid for as part of the purchase price may well be lost. The disclosure
requirements are found chiefly in section 102, which requires that
warrantors who choose to offer written warranties on consumer prod-
ucts "shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully
and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language
the terms and conditions of such warranty. '24 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is to establish rules regulating the content of the
necessary disclosures25 and section 102(a) lists an assortment of items
which may be incorporated in such rules. The language of the Act,
however, permits the FTC to omit any of the listed items and to
require the disclosure of additional information.2 6 Several of the
items enumerated in section 102(a) deserve special mention. The identity
of the parties to whom the warranty extends must be disclosed, 27 and a
warrantor offering a "full" warranty is unable to limit substantially the
class of people to which the warranty extends. 28 The various enforcement
mechanisms available to the consumer niust also be disclosed. 29 The
remaining provisions in section 102(a) contain few surprises. The im-
portance of such information has already been recognized by the FTC
24. Warranty Act § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a) (Supp. 1, 1975).
25. The FTC has previously dealt with warranty disclosure under Federal Trade Commission
Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1, 1975). See, e.g., Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838
(7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 952 (1962); Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1946).
26. The Commission's Proposed Rule on Warranty Disclosures would require that all
modifications or limitations of implied warranties and all exclusions or limitations on damages be
disclosed in large type, capital letters, or underlined. Ifany such modification, limitation or exclusion
is unenforceable under state law, this fact must be disclosed together with a list of non-enforcing
jurisdictions. The rule would also require that the warranty contain a statement informing the
consumer of the existence of implied warranties and of the possibility of court action to enforce his
various legal rights. In addition, if a "lifetime" warranty is offered, a clear disclosure of the "life"
referred to would be required; if the warrantor employs "owner registration cards," their use and
purpose must also be disclosed in the warranty. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,892-93 (July 16, 1975).
27. Warranty Act § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a)(2) (Supp. 1, 1975).
28. Id. § 104(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b)(4) (Supp. 1, 1975). See notes 76-79 infra and
accompanying text. In addition, UCC § 2-318 restricts a warrantor's right to limit the extent of
his liability with respect to injury to the person.
29. Warranty Act § 102(a)(8)-(9), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a)(8)-(9) (Supp. 1, 1975).
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in its Guides Against Deceptive Advertising of Guarantees. 30 In addition,
section 102(b)(1)(B) permits, but does not compel, the FTC to prescribe
the manner and form in which the required information is to be
presented.
Section 102 also requires the FTC to prescribe rules which will
insure that the terms of a written warranty are made available to the
prospective buyer prior to sale. Previously it was not uncommon for
manufacturers to enclose the warranty within the product packaging.
The buyer might be told that the product was "guaranteed," but he
would not have an opportunity to examine the actual language of the
warranty until after he had arrived home with his purchase. Such a
practice obviously makes it impossible for the consumer to "shop
around" and compare the warranties being offered by different retail-
ers or manufacturers. To make matters worse, the enclosed warranty
might contain language purporting to limit or disclaim the implied
warranties which may have arisen at the time of sale. Under the UCC
such post-sale limitations or disclaimers would generally be ineffec-
tive. 31 Having been made after the sale has been completed, they
would be viewed as contract modifications, which require the agree-
ment of both parties. 32 If the contract for sale is within the Statute of
Frauds, a writing would also be required to effectuate such a mod-
ification. 33 Some warrantors, however, employ a particularly deplor-
able method of surmounting these hurdles. The product is
accompanied by a warranty registration card which, in addition to the
disclaimers, contains a request that the buyer sign and return the
card to the warrantor in order to obtain the benefits flowing from
the written warranty. The buyer may well believe that he will have no
rights whatever if he does not comply with the request. The signature is
then used as evidence of acquiescence to the modification or disclaimer.
Whenever a written warranty is given, section 108 prohibits the
modification or disclaimer of implied warranties, even when attempted
prior to purchase. 34 In some instances, however, the duration of implied
warranties may still be limited and the warrantor may limit or exclude his
liability for consequential damages arising from breach of such warran-
ties. Section 102(b)(1)(A), however, requires that the terms of the
30. 16 C.F.R. § 239 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 19S (L. Div.
1968) (disclaimer contained in warranty delivered after contract for purchase was signed held
inoperative); Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446 S.W.2d 521 (1969) (written
warranty containing disclaimer delivered subsequent to sale held not to exclude or modify implied
warranty of merchantability).
32. UCC § 2-209. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 363 (1972).
33. UCC § 2-209(3).
34. See notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.
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warranty be disclosed to the consumer before sale. Apparently, therefore,
a warrantor is prohibited from imposing even these limitations on
implied warranties by means of language contained in a warranty or
warranty registration card which is not available for inspection prior to
purchase. 35
Section 102(b)(2) emphasizes an important limitation in the ap-
proach taken by the Act. No manufacturer or retailer is compelled to
give a written warranty in connection with the sale of any consumer
product. The Act regulates only the form and effect of those warranties
which manufacturers and retailers choose to offer. As a result there
may be a real danger that businessmen, wary of the more stringent
standards contained in the Act, will actually reduce the number of
written warranties they furnish to consumers. Both Congress and the
FTC, however, apparently believe that competitive pressures will
force most manufacturers and retailers to improve rather than curtail
their warranty coverage. 3 6 This view may be overly optimistic. The
continued existence of the abuses which ultimately prompted con-
gressional action may well indicate that competitive forces are not
particularly active in this aspect of retail marketing. Only time will
reveal whether the restrictions created by the Act will induce a sig-
nificant number of manufacturers and retailers to abandon their use of
written warranties. 37
Section 102(d) permits the FTC to draft substantive provisions
which warrantors may incorporate by reference in their written
warranties. This authority, however, may undercut one of the princi-
pal benefits yielded by the comprehensive disclosure provisions. If the
obligations of both parties are clearly delineated at the time of sale,
later disagreements as to their respective responsibilities may be
greatly reduced. For this purpose it makes little difference whether the
35. The Commission's Proposed Rule on Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms
would require the seller to make available a binder containing the warranties on all warranted
products. The Proposed Rule on Warranty Disclosures would compel the disclosure in such
warranties of all limitations on implied warranties. In addition, the latter rule specifically deals
with warranty registration cards, stating that a warrantor who uses such cards as a condition
precedent to warranty coverage must disclose that fact in the warranty itself. 40 Fed. Reg.
29,892-95 (July 16, 1975).
36. See 120 Cong. Rec. 21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Magnuson);
BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 699, at A-i (Feb. 4, 1975) (remarks of Christopher S.
White, Assistant to the Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection).
37. The Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers has indicated that some of its member
companies are indeed considering terminating their use of written warranties. The Association
has reportedly told the FTC that it will cost "hundreds of millions of dollars, or perhaps billions"
to make changes in the inventory, advertising, catalogs and point-of-sale materials necessary for
compliance with the Act. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 717, at A-7 to A-8 (June 10,
1975).
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terms of the agreement explicitly appear in the warranty itself, or are
simply- alluded to by a reference to a government publication. But
pre-sale disclosure serves the additional function of assisting the po-
tential buyer in assessing the value of the proposed warranty. Viewed
in this light, incorporation by reference may be counterproductive
since the "canned" provisions may not be readily available to the
consumer at the time and place the decision to purchase must be made.
Such references will be of little help in any serious attempt to evaluate
the quality of the warranty protection being offered. The buyer can
properly assess only those provisions actually appearing on the face of
the warranty. Since the FTC is not required to draft such "canned"
provisions, their use should be carefully restricted. Fortunately, the
Commission appears to be aware of the potential for abuse. 38
Finally, section 102(e) limits the application of the entire section to
warranties on consumer products "actually costing" more than five
dollars. The term "actually costing" is not defined in the Act, but the
legislative history indicates that the phrase is meant to exclude all sales
taxes. Thus the warranty on a product costing $4.98 would not be
covered by the disclosure requirements of section 102 even if the
imposition of a sales tax raised the consumer's bill to more than five
dollars. 39
The draftsmen of the Act recognized that service contracts are often
used as substitutes for written warranties. As a result, section 106
subjects such contracts to similar disclosure requirements. The regula-
tory authority given to the FTC in connection with service contracts is
intended to be coextensive with its corresponding authority over
written warranties. 40
The Act gives particular attention to warranties offered in connection
with the sale of used motor vehicles. Such warranties, of course, are
subject to the general regulatory provisions of the Act. The Commis-
sion is also authorized by section 109(b) to supplement that protection
by means of rules specifically aimed at used car warranties. Although
the FTC may not require that a written warranty be given when a
used car is offered for sale, the commission is permitted to require that
38. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 699 at A-2 (Feb. 4, 1975).
39. House Report, supra note 4, at 36. The FTC has indicated it will interpret the five dollar
minimum to include "multiple packaged items" costing more than five dollars, even if the items
might individually sell for less than that amount, if they are in fact packaged in a manner that
does not permit such individual sale. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,722 (June 18, 1975).
It should be emphasized that section 102 does not distinguish between "full" and "limited"
warranties, as those terms are used in section 103. The section applies to all written warranties on
consumer products costing more than five dollars regardless of their section 103 designations.
40. House Report, supra note 4, at 39.
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the absence of a warranty be clearly disclosed to the consumer.41 This
authority goes beyond that given with respect to other products. The
general power to regulate disclosure granted in section 102(a) pertains
only to the terms and conditions of written warranties. Therefore, the
latter section probably does not permit the FTC to require that the
absence of such a warranty on other products be disclosed.
The requirements set forth in section 102 are meant to preempt
differing state disclosure regulations: such regulations are inapplicable
to warranties covered by the Act. 42 The purpose of section 111(c) is
revealed in the Senate Commerce Committee Report on the Act:
States would be preempted from requiring labeling or disclosure requirements that
differed from those prescribed pursuant to title I of this bill. This was designed to
insure that suppliers of consumer products would not have to print warranties in
conformance with the many possible State and Territorial disclosure formulas or
labeling procedures.
43
Section 111(c)(2) allows the FTC to permit differing state disclosure
requirements only when it determines that such requirements increase
the protection afforded the consumer and do not unduly burden
interstate commerce. Unfortunately, like so many of the Act's pro-
visions, section 111(c) is not without its ambiguities. The subsection is
introduced by the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)." The
provisions of subsection (c) are thus subordinate to those of the prior
subsection. The resulting interaction is obscure at best. Section 111
(b)(1) purports to preserve all rights and remedies of consumers under
state or other federal law. Section 111(b)(2) provides that, with the
exception of sections 108, 104(a)(2) and (4), the Act does not affect
liability for personal injury or state laws pertaining to consequential
damages. It is not clear whether the reference in subsection (c) was
meant to include both paragraphs of subsection (b). Considering
section 11 1(b)(2) together with subsection (c), it would appear that state
disclosure or labeling requirements which are directed at questions of
liability for personal injury or consequential damages are not pre-
empted by section 111(c). If this were not so, subsection (c) would have
precisely the effect which paragraph (b)(2) attempts to avoid. But if
state requirements directed at liability for personal injury or conse-
quential damages are not preempted by federal regulations, the
purpose of subsection (c) is undercut. 44 Thus, the wording of other
41. warranty Act § 109(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2309(b) (Supp. 1, 1975).
42. Id. § 111(c)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2311(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1, 1975).
43. S. Rep. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973).
44. It is also difficult to reconcile subsection (c) with section 111(b)(I). That provision
preserves the consumer's rights and remedies under state law. Thus if state law permits a
consumer to recover damages caused by the failure of a warrantor to meet a state disclosure or
[Vol. 44
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parts of the Act creates the implication that section 11 1(c) is narrower
in scope than the Senate Commerce Committee Report would indicate.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION OF WRITTEN WARRANTIES-
SECTIONS 102(c), 103, 104, 105, 107 AND 108
The disclosure requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
represent only one aspect of its overall regulatory scheme. Of greater
significance are the provisions governing the substantive content of
written warranties. At the core of this phase of the Act is the
mandatory designation of written warranties as either a "full (state-
ment of duration) warranty" or a "limited warranty." 45 A warranty
failing to meet federal minimum standards must be conspicuously
designated as'a "limited warranty." 46 All warranties falling within the
scope of section 103 must carry one of these two designations. Al-
though warrantors are not obligated to offer "full" warranties, it is the
hope of the Act's sponsors that competitive pressure will induce an
increasing number to provide such warranties.4 7 It is impossible to
foretell the outcome of such a strategy. Manufacturers and retailers
will surely be aware of the negative psychological impact associated
with the term "limited warranty." Not only will potential buyers be
alerted to possible shortcomings in the warranty itself, but they may
also infer that the warrantor's reluctance to offer more complete
protection betrays his own lack of confidence in the performance of his
product. On the other hand, as noted earlier, the continued existence
of many of the problems which served to give rise to the Act suggests
that warranty practices are often well insulated from competitive
forces.
labeling requirement, paragraph (b)(1) would appear to exempt such a requirement from the
preemptive effect of section 111(c). If such a disclosure or labeling requirement was rendered
inapplicable by subsection (c), the result would seemingly be to "invalidate or restrict" a "right or
remedy" established by state law, in violation of section 11 l(b)(l). As a result, state disclosure or
labeling requirements which give rise to corresponding private rights or remedies in the consumer
may be unaffected by section 11 1(c). If the reference in section 11 l(c) includes both paragraphs of
subsection (b), the only state disclosure or labeling requirements which are preempted by
subsection (c) may be those which are not directed at liability for personal injury or consequential
damages and which do not create private rights or remedies in the consumer.
45. Warranty Act § 103(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2303(a) (Supp. 1, 1975).
46. The FTC has stated that it will interpret the language of section 103(a) as requiring that
the designation be in the form of a caption or title, clearly separated from the text of the
warranty. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,722 (June 18, 1975). In addition, the Proposed Rule on Pre-Sale
Availability of Written Warranty Terms would require that the designation (together with a
statement informing the consumer that a copy of the warranty is available from the retailer) be
clearly and conspicuously displayed on both the product itself and the product container,
packaging or carton. Id. at 29,894 (July 16, 1975).
47. 120 Cong. Rec. 21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Section 103(b) exempts "expressions of general pqlicy concerning
customer satisfaction" from both the disclosure and desi' ation re-
quirements. The intention is to exclude such statements as " 'satisfac-
tion guaranteed or your money refunded.' ,,48 This exemption is not
available, however, if the general policy is subject to any limitations.
If, for example, the offer to refund is limited in duration or requires
some action on the part of the consumer as a condition precedent,
subsection (b) would not be applicable. 4 9 Presumably, even those
statements which are excluded under section 103(b) remain subject to
regulation under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and in particular
under the FTC guidelines dealing with such representations. 50 In
addition to the subsection (b) exemptions, the Commission is granted
authority to exempt other written warranties from the designation
requirements of section 103(a) by virtue of subsection (c).
Subsection (d) provides that the designation requirements of section
103 apply only to warranties on consumer products "actually costing"
more than ten dollars.5 1 Warranties on products priced between five and
ten dollars are thus subject to the disclosure regulations while exempt
from the designation provisions of section 103. Subsection (d) also
contains one of the linguistic enigmas with which the Act seems to
abound. It limits the application of section 103(a) and (c) to warranties
which "are not designated 'full (statement of duration) warranties,' -152So
that those subsections are not applicable to warranties which are already
so designated. 5 3 Obviously, section 103(c) would be inapplicable, since
48. House Report, supra note 4, at 37.
49. The FTC has indicated that it will not consider policy statements applying to some, but
not all, of the consumer products manufactured by a single supplier as being expressions of
"general policy" within the meaning of section 103(b). It has also stated that the word "guarantee"
rather than the word "warranty" is the appropriate term for use in expressions of policy. 40 Fed. Reg.
25,722 (June 18, 1975).
50. Warranty Act § 11(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2311(a)(1) (Supp. 1, 1975). The FTC Guides
Against Deceptive Advertising of Guarantees, 16 C.F.R. § 239 (1974), construe such general
representations as a "guarantee that the full purchase price will be refunded at the option of the
purchaser." Id. § 239.3(a). Any conditions or limitations on such a guarantee must be clearly
and conspicuously disclosed. Id. § 239.1. Since general expressions of policy are not subject to the
section 102 disclosure provisions, the FTC Guides are not superseded with respect to such guarantees
by the new rules being promulgated under that section. See 40 Fed. Reg. 25,724 (June 18, 1975). The
enforcement procedures of section 110 of the Act may also be applicable to such representations. Id.
at 25,722.
51. Again, the term "actually costing" refers to the purchase price before the imposition of sales
taxes. The ten dollar minimum should be compared with the five dollar minimum established in
section 102(e) for purposes of that section's disclosure requirements. The FTC has indicated that It
will interpret the ten dollar minimum as it has the five dollar minimum in section 102, to include
"multiple packaged items." See note 39 supra.
52. Warranty Act § 103(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2303(d) (Supp. 1, 1975).
53. These subsections are not made inapplicable to warranties designated as "limited."
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that section merely permits the FTC to exempt certain warranties from
carrying any designation at all. But subsection (a) is also rendered
inapplicable to warranties designated as "full." Thus such warranties
need not comply with section 103(a)(1), which permits the use of the term
"full" only when the warranty meets the minimum standards set out in
section 104. This rather bizarre result, however, must be considered in
conjunction with section 104(e), which states that if a supplier5 4
designates a warranty as "full," it shall be deemed to incorporate the
minimum requirements of section 104. Therefore, although section
103(d) appears to permit the designation of warranties as "full" even
when they do not meet the minimum section 104 standards, such
standards will be implied by law in any warranty so designated.
Since section 104(e) does not contain the ten dollar limitation found
in section 103(d), warranties on consumer products costing less than
that amount, but which are designated as "full," will be held to
incorporate the minimum standards. 55 The warrantors of such prod-
ucts are not compelled to make any designation whatsoever by virtue
of section 103(d), but if they voluntarily choose to take advantage of
the merchandising value of the "full" designation they will be held to
the minimum standards. In order to avoid inadvertently being swept up
by section 104(e), manufacturers and retailers who do not wish to meet
the section 104 standards should insure that the words "full warranty"
do not appear on packaging or advertising.5 6
It should be noted that section 103 does not require that a "full"
warranty be applicable to the entire product. Section 105 permits a
warrantor to offer a "full" warranty covering only a portion of the
product while offering a "limited" warranty on the remainder, pro-
vided the two are clearly differentiated. Section 103 would then
require that both warranties be properly designated.57 Section 105
specifically deals only with the case where "full" and "limited" war-
ranties are given on the same product. Presumably a warrantor may
offer a "full" warranty on one portion of the product while giving no
Subsection (a) would therefore apply, and the mandatory language in paragraph (a)(1) would
presumably require that the designation be changed to "full" if in fact the warranty meets the
minimum standards of section 104.
54. The distinction between the terms "warrantor" and "supplier" has been discussed in
connection with section 101. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
55. The House-Senate conferees clearly intended this result, although they may possibly have
believed that section 103(d), rather than section 104(e), carried out their intent. See Senate
Report, supra note 11, at 24.
56. Presumably such terms as "fully warranted" or "fully guaranteed," appearing on products
costing less than ten dollars (and therefore not committed to the use of the official language of section
103(a)) would likewise trigger the operation of section 104(e).
57. See House Report, supra note 4, at 39.
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written warranty of any kind on the remainder. Section 102(a)(3) clearly
anticipates the existence of warranties which extend to only specific parts
of the products. Section 102, of course, would require that the reduced
scope of the warranty be adequately disclosed.
Section 104(a) sets forth the minimum standards applicable to "full"
warranties.5 8 Under paragraph (a)(1), the warrantor must "remedy"
the consumer product within a reasonable time and without charge. An
obligation to remedy may arise because of either a defect in the product
itself, or because of a failure to conform to the written warranty. The
term "remedy" is defined in section 101(10). It can consist of repair,
replacement or refund, at the option of the warrantor, except that a
refund may be given only with the consent of the consumer or when
replacement cannot be made and repair is impractical. Unhappily, the
Act does not specify the precise time at which the consumer must
evidence his willingness to accept a refund. It might be argued that the
seller may extract such consent at the time of sale. The language of
section 101(10), however, appears to allow the consumer to retain his
right to accept or reject the refund until such time as the necessity for
remedy actually arises. Under this interpretation, section 104(a)(1)
would preclude a warrantor from limiting the buyer's remedy to a
refund of the purchase price when a "full" warranty has been given.5 9
The section 101(12) definition of "refund" allows a warrantor to deduct
reasonable depreciation only where permitted by FTC rules. Until
such rules are promulgated, the warrantor may not make any such
deductions. 60 The "replacement" remedy, as defined in section 101(11),
may be accomplished by furnishing either an "identical" or "reasonably
equivalent" product.
The duties set forth in section 104(a)(1) must be read in connection
with those in section 104(a)(4). This latter provision is directed at those
consumer products which outwardly resemble toasters, televisions or
automobiles, but are in reality "lemons." If a product remains de-
fective, or does not conform to the warranty after a "reasonable
number of attempts" to repair it, the warrantor must allow the
consumer to choose either replacement without charge or refund. 61
Thus the consumer is not obligated to permit an unlimited number of
repair attempts. A warrantor offering a "full" warranty cannot limit
the remedy to repair or replacement as permitted by UCC section
58. Section 104(b)(3) authorizes the FTC to define the standards in more detail, and to deal
with their application to particular products.
59. UCC § 2-719 would ordinarily permit such a limitation.
60. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 23.
61. Normally, the warrantor has the option of choosing repair, replacement or (with the
consent of the consumer) refund. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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2-719, since the consumer has the right to demand a refund if the
product proves unrepairable. 62 The FTC is given authority to specify
by rule what constitutes a "reasonable number" of repair attempts
under various circumstances. 63
Sections 104(b)(1) and (b)(2) shed light on the nature of the remedial
duties imposed by sections 104(a)(1) and (a)(4). These provisions care-
fully limit the obligations which the warrantor may properly place
upon the consumer. The warrantor may, of course, demand that the
consumer give notice of the defect or nonconformity. Presumably the
"reasonable time" within which the warrantor must remedy the product
under paragraph (a)(1) is measured from the time of such notifica-
tion.64 Aside from the duty to give notice, all obligations imposed on the
consumer are subject to the reasonableness standard established by
section 104(b)(1). It is not clear, however, whether the warrantor's
unconditional right to require notification includes the right to specify
the time and form of such notice. 65 Such requirements should probably
be treated in the same manner as are other potential consumer
obligations under section 104(b)(1), and thus be subject to the reason-
ableness test contained in that provision. The reasonableness of the
duties imposed upon the consumer may be contested in a variety of
settings. The Commission may also seek to enjoin the imposition of the
requirement under sections 110(b) and (c)(1). The fact that the
Commission has not promulgated a rule dealing with the type of
obligation in question would not prohibit the warrantor from at-
tempting to impose it. 66 The requirement could then be tested in an
action for breach of warranty, but the burden would be on the
warrantor to establish the reasonableness of the proposed obligation. 67
The warrantor may also require that the product be "made avail-
able" to him "free and clear of liens and other encumbrances. "68 The
House Commerce Committee evidently believed that the "made avail-
able" language would permit the warrantor to demand that the con-
62. Warranty Act § 104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304{a)(4) (Supp. 1, 1975).
63. Id.
64. The proposed rule on warranty disclosure would require the warrantor to specify the
period of time within which, after notification of the defect, remedial action will be forthcoming.
40 Fed. Reg. 29,893 (July 16, 1975).
65. Since section 1l1(bXl) preserves the consumer's rights and remedies under state law, the
notification should in any case be given as soon as possible after discovery of the defect or
nonconformity in order to comply with UCC § 2-607(3)(a), thereby safeguarding the consumer's
right to damages under UCC § 2-714.
66. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 25.
67. The House-Senate Conferees indicated that cost and inconvenience to the consumer are to
be weighed against the resulting benefits to the warrantor in deciding the reasonableness of the
obligation. Id.
68. Warranty Act § 104(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b)(2) (Supp. 1, 1975).
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sumer return the product to the place of purchase. 69 Since section
104(b)(1) would not be applicable, such a requirement would not be
subject to that section's reasonableness standard. Perhaps the obligation
described in paragraph (b)(2) should not be read as including the physical
delivery of the product to a particular location, but rather as simply
requiring the consumer to furnish clear legal title. Any requirement
concerning the actual delivery of the product would then be subject to the
reasonableness standard of section 104(b)(1).
The remedial obligations imposed upon warrantors by sections
104(a)(1) and (a)(4) are to be performed "without charge" to the consumer.
This term is defined in subsection (d). The warrantor is not permitted to
seek reimbursement for any cost incurred in connection with the required
remedy. The section 104(a)(1) 70 obligation to remedy without charge does
not require the warrantor to pay for incidental expenses incurred by the
consumer. 71 However, if the warrantor falls to provide a remedy within a
reasonable time, or imposes an unreasonable duty upon the consumer in
violation of subsection (b), the consumer's incidental expenses are
recoverable. 72
Section 107 permits the warrantor to designate a representative to
perform the remedial duties imposed by section 104(a), as well as all
other obligations arising under a written or implied warranty.
Nevertheless, the warrantor himself remains responsible to the con-
sumer for the proper performance of these obligations. 73
In addition to the minimum remedial standards established by
sections 104(a)(1) and (a)(4), the content of "full" warranties is further
regulated by paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3). Section 104(a)(2) operates in
conjunction with section 108 to prohibit any disclaimer or modification
of implied warranties, including limitations as to duration, whenever a
"full" written warranty is given. Section 104(a)(3) requires that any
limitation or exclusion of consequential damages resulting from a
breach of either a written or implied warranty must conspicuously 74
69. See House Report, supra note 4, at 38.
70. Section 104(d) refers to "subsection (aX 1)(A)," which, alas, does not exist. The reference is
probably to section 104(a)(1), and possibly to section 104(aX4) as well.
71. The warrantor may, of course, go beyond the minimum requirements of section 104 and
undertake such an obligation in his warranty.
72. Warranty Act § 104(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(d) (Supp. 1, 1975).
73. Section 107 also provides that the warrantor "shall make reasonable arrangements for
compensation of such designated representatives." The draftsmen did not intend that such
compensation necessarily take the form of cash payments. In the case of a retailer who is
designated by a manufacturer, the compensation may be in the form of an increased margin
between the wholesale and retail prices. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 28.
74. UCC § 2-719(3), which deals with the limitations or exclusion of consequential damages,
does not explicitly require such conspicuousness. The Proposed Rule on Warranty Disclosures would
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appear on the face of any "full" warranty. 7" Section 111(b) preserves
the consumer's rights and remedies under state law and also provides
that the Act shall not supersede state requirements concerning con-
sequential damages. UCC section 2-719(3) permits the exclusion or
limitation of consequential damages only where such action is not
unconscionable. In the case of consumer products, limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person is prima facie unconscionable.
Thus, a warrantor offering a"full" warranty must also comply with UCC
section 2-719(3) in order to effectively limit his liability for consequential
damages.
Section 104 does more than define the nature of the obligations as-
sociated with "full" warranties-it governs the range of those obliga-
tions as well. Section 104(b)(4) declares that the duties imposed upon
warrantors by subsection (a) shall extend to all persons who are
"consumers" with respect to the particular product. The term "con-
sumer" is defined in section 101(3), and includes not only the original
buyer, but also any person to whom the product is transferred, and any
person who is entitled by the terms of the warranty itself or by state law to
enforce the warrantor's obligations. As a result, the duty to remedy
created by section 104(a)(1) extends to all subsequent transferees of the
product. Both the original buyer and later transferees may demand that
the warrantor remedy any defect or nonconformity or be liable for
damages for breach of warranty under either section 110(d) or UCC
section 2-714.76 In an action for breach of warranty the consumer could
recover the economic loss resulting from the decreased value of the
unrepaired product. 77 Consequential damages resulting from injury to
personal property, however, would not necessarily be recoverable. By
virtue of section 111(b), the recovery of these damages is controlled by
state law. Therefore, a transferee who seeks to recover such damages
resulting from a failure to remedy as required by section 104(a)(1) must
satisfy any common law or UCC section 2-318 privity requirements,78 or
require that such a limitation or exclusion be printed in large type, capital letters, or underlined. 40
Fed. Reg. 29,893 (July 16, 1975).
75. The FTC has said that it will interpret the section 110 prohibition against "deceptive"
warranties as requiring that such limitations or exclusions of consequential damages also
conspicuously appear when used in connection with "limited" warranties. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,723
(June 18, 1975).
76. Section 110(d) gives consumers a cause of action for breach of warranty for failure to
comply with any obligation imposed by the Act. Alternatively, since the duties set forth in section
104 are incorporated in "full" warranties for purposes of state law as well, a suit for breach of
warranty under the UCC could be initiated.
77. This type of economic harm is often referred to as a "loss of the bargain." W. Prosser,
Torts § 101, at 666-67 (4th ed. 1971); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 333-35
(1972).
78. See Autrey v. Chemtrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 (D. Del. 1973).
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rely on a theory of strict liability in tort.7 9 In addition section 104(b)(4)
would also permit a transferee to attempt to overcome a limitation or
exclusion of consequential damages contained in a "full" warranty on the
basis of noncompliance with section 104(a)(3).
The extension of the warrantor's obligations by section 104(b)(4) has
even greater significance with respect to the other two duties imposed
by subsection (a). Section 11 1(b)(2), which restricts the effect of the Act
in the areas of liability for personal injury and consequential damages,
specifically excludes sections 104(a)(2) and (4) from its operation.
Thus, if a warrantor fails to permit a consumer to elect a refund or
replacement when prior repairs have proven unsuccessful, as required
by section 104(a)(4), a transferee may recover any resulting damages
flowing from injury to person or property in an action under section
110(d) without becoming entangled in state law questions of privity or
strict tort liability. In addition, the consumer can of course recover the
economic loss arising from the reduced value of the unrepairable prod-
uct. Finally, the obligation under section 104(a)(2) to forego the im-
position of any limitation on the duration of implied warranties is also
extended by section 104(b)(4) to benefit transferees. As with section
104(a)(4), paragraph (a)(2) is excluded from the limiting language in
section 11 1(b)(2), and violations may therefore give rise to liability for
personal injury and consequential damages irrespective of state law.
The substantive regulation of written warranties is not confined to
the minimum standards set forth in section 104. It is section 108 which
most significantly restricts the permissible content of written war-
ranties. Section 108 deals with an aspect of consumer product war-
ranties that attracted particular attention from the Task Force on
Appliance Warranties and Service 8 -the disclaiming of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness. The practice of using a
written warranty as a vehicle for the disclaimer of all implied war-
ranties is particularly unfortunate. Almost without exception the buyer
will believe that he is receiving protection beyond that which would be
his in the absence of the written warranty. He will often in fact have
fewer rights as a result of his dubious acquisition. "The bold print
giveth and the fine print taketh away."8' More precisely, the bold print
giveth and the fine print taketh away even more. A written warranty
can be worse than useless where it reduces the rights and remedies
available to the consumer. Section 108 is designed to eliminate this
practice of disclaiming implied warranties by means of express written
79. See Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 App. Div. 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't 1973).
80. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
81. House Report, supra note 4, at 24.
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warranties. 82 Subsection (a) prohibits a supplier from disclaiming or
modifying any implied warranty whenever the supplier either offers a
written warranty or enters into a service contract with the consumer
within ninety days of the sale. 83 Unlike the requirements of section
104, this restriction extends to both "full" and "limited" warranties.
Section 108 significantly curtails the warrantor's right under UCC
section 2-316 to disclaim the implied warranties that arise under UCC
sections 2-314 and 2-315. A seller may, of course, disclaim or modify
the implied warranties whenever no written warranty is offered. 84
Similarly, section 108(a) does not prevent a seller from excluding all
implied warranties by means of an "as is" or "with all faults" sale, since
no written warranty would accompany such a purchase.,s In the case
of the "as is" sale, or where a disclaimer is given in the absence of a
written warranty, the limitations on the seller's obligations can easily
be recognized and evaluated accordingly. Even if the buyer does not
fully understand how his rights are affected by the disclaimer, he will
surely appreciate the fact that something is being taken away from
him. When the disclaimer is contained within a written warranty, the
potential buyer may believe that the warranty enhances his position
and thus count it as an advantage when deciding whether to purchase.
Even if he carefully reads the language of the warranty he may
incorrectly believe that on the whole the warranty increases his
protection. The rights conferred upon him by the written warranty are
boldly spelled out, while those being withdrawn are hidden within such
legalistic terms as "merchantability" and "implied warranty."
It should be emphasized that section 108(a) was evidently not
intended to restrict a warrantor's right to limit or exclude liability for
consequential damages arising from breach of an implied warranty,
even when a written warranty is given. The subsection prohibits only
disclaimers or modifications of the implied warranties themselves, not
82. Disclaimer of implied warranties under state law is governed by UCC § 2-316. Several
states, however, have enacted non-uniform provisions which restrict the right of a seller to
disclaim or modify implied warranties when the sale involves consumer goods. E.g., Ala. Code
tit. 7A, § 2-316(5) (1966); Cal. Civ: Code Ann. §§ 1790-95 (1973); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. ii,
§ 2-316(5) (Supp. 1974); Md. Ann. Code art. 95B, § 2-316A (Supp. 1974); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
106, § 2-316A (Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. ch. 72, §§ 72.8010-.8200 (1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 62A.2-316(4) (Supp. 1974); W. Va. Code
ch. 46A, § 46A-6-107 (Supp. 1974).
83. This section is addressed to "suppliers" and not "warrantors." As previously discussed,
the former term may be narrower in scope than the latter. See notes 17-23 supra and accom-
panying text.
84. The seller may, however, be limited by other provisions of state law. See note 82 supra
and accompanying text.
85. 120 Cong. Rec. 21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Magnuson); see UCC
§ 2-316(3)(a).
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limitations on the warrantor's liability for damages resulting from
breach of such warranties. Even a warrantor offering a "full" written
warranty is specifically permitted by section 104(a)(3) to exclude or
limit his liability for consequential damages growing out of a breach of
an implied warranty, provided the limitation is conspicuous.
Section 108(b) establishes a single exception to the general prohibi-
tion against disclaimers or modifications set forth in subsection (a). A
warrantor offering a "limited" warranty may confine the duration of
his implied warranties to that of the written warranty. Several re-
strictions are imposed in connection with this concession. The duration
must be reasonable, not unconscionable, and be set forth in clear
language prominently displayed. No such exception is permitted in the
case of "full" written warranties. The language of section 108(b) does not
indicate whether compliance with the conditions set out in that subsec-
tion alone is sufficient to limit successfully the duration of the implied
warranties, or whether these requirements are intended to supplement
those imposed by state law. More specifically, UCC section 2-316(2)
requires that language modifying an implied warranty be conspicuous,
and also requires, with respect to the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity, that the word "merchantability" specifically be used. One could argue
that compliance with only the federal requirements would be sufficient
for purposes of the Act.86 The question is not likely to arise, however,
because section 111(b)(1) preserves the consumer's rights and remedies
under state law.8 7
Under subsection (c), disclaimers or modifications of implied
warranties made in violation of section 108 are ineffective for purposes
of both the Act and state law. Thus, when a written warranty is given,
the consumer may ignore any disclaimer or modification (other than a
limitation of duration in compliance with subsection (b)) and maintain
an action for breach of an implied warranty under either state law or
section 110(d). Since section 108 is specifically excluded from the
operation of section 111(b)(2), the consumer may recover damages for
personal injury and other consequential damages without regard to
state law.
One final provision should be included in this survey of sections
dealing with the substantive content of written warranties. Section
102(c) provides that a warrantor may not tie a written or implied
86. The opening phrase of section 108(b) ("(flor purposes of this title') would appear to
support the conclusion that the federal requirements are intended as the exclusive criteria for
modification when the proprietyof such a limitation in duration is raised in an action under the Act.
87. Both the state and federal requirements for modification of implied warranties should be
met in order to insure that the limitation on duration is effective.
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warranty to the use of particular support products or services, unless
permission to do so is first obtained from the FTC.8 s The only
exception to this rule concerns support products or services which the
warrantor offers without charge. The draftsmen wisely provided for
public comment on all applications for waiver of this tying restriction.
Participation by manufacturers of competing support products will no
doubt be an effective check on the proliferation of such exemptions. It
should be noted that the subsection applies to both "full" and "limited"
warranties, as well as to any implied warranty, on consumer products
costing more than five dollars. 89
V. REMEDIES-SECTIONS 110 AND 111
The Task Force on Appliance Warranties concluded that practical
means of enforcing warranty obligations were not available to most
consumers. 90 Regulation of disclosure and content would be of little
value in the absence of the remedial- procedures of section 110.91 The
section is broad in scope and the procedural machinery it creates may be
used to enforce both the innovative regulations contained in the Act, as
well as all other obligations arising under a written or implied warranty.
The remedial procedures of section 110 may prove even more significant
than the Act's substantive regulations.
Congress, cognizant of the great volume of consumer product
transactions, 92 realized that the ultimate solution to the enforcement
problems associated with consumer product warranties would not be
found wholly within the overtaxed federal and state judicial systems.
It placed primary emphasis on informal settlement procedures. The
objective was to minimize expenditure of time and money while
adequately insuring the fundamental fairness of the decision-making
process. The FTC is ordered to prescribe rules establishing minimum
standards for informal settlement mechanisms, 93 and is given the
authority in section 110(a)(4) to review all such informal procedures in
light of its promulgated regulations. 94 Although the impetus for review
88. The tying of service and support products may also constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws. See Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (manufacturer's service contract obligations tied to use of its copying
supplies).
89. Warranty Act § 102(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2302(e) (Supp. 1, 1975).
90. House Report, supra note 4, at 27.
91. Warranty Act § 110, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310 (Supp. 1, 1975).
92. See House Report, supra note 4, at 22-23.
93. Warranty Act § 110(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(a)(2) (Supp. 1, 1975).
94. The Commission's Proposed Minimum Standards Rule wvould prohibit any party to a
dispute, or any employee or agent of any party, from acting as a decision-maker in any informal
mechanism. If the dispute is to be decided by less than three persons, none may be involved in
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may arise from within the Commission, the FTC is also obligated to
undertake a review upon the filing of a written complaint by any
interested party. Whether Commission resources are inadequate to
undertake such an obligation is uncertain. 95 Participation by inde-
pendent or governmental entities in the informal decision-making
process is required. These may include agencies on the state or local
level or small claims courts. 96 Informal settlement mechanisms may be
established by a single warrantor to serve his own needs, or may
involve more extensive, even industry-wide, participation. 97
The congressional policy embodied in section 110 is one of en-
couragement rather than coercion. No warrantor is compelled to insti-
tute or participate in any informal settlement mechanism. Before dis-
missing the possibility, however, the warrantor should consider the
impact of section 110(d)(2), which permits a court to award costs and
expenses, including attorneys'fees, if the consumer prevails in a formal
judicial proceeding. Warrantors who do not wish to risk imposition of
such costs may find that inexpensive, informal procedures can offer
benefits to both parties.
A warrantor may compel initial resort to an informal settlement
mechanism which satisfies FTC rules by simply incorporating such a
requirement into the written warranty. It is not clear whether the
the manufacture, distribution or sale of any product; if three or more persons will participate in
the decision, at least two-thirds must have no such involvement. The informal mechanism must
have written operating procedures, and must be provided to the consumer free of charge. If
contradictory information is submitted to the settlement body, both parties must be notified and
given an opportunity to rebut or explain such information, or to submit additional materials. Oral
presentations are permitted only if both parties agree, and the consumer must be informed of this
fact before his consent is obtained. A decision must be made within forty days of the notification
of the dispute unless the delay is due solely to the consumer. If the delay is not the fault of the
consumer, the requirement of initial resort to the mechanism is satisfied after this forty day
period, even if no decision has been rendered. The decision may provide for any remedy available
under either the written warranty or the Act, and must specify a reasonable time for compliance.
The decision, together with supporting reasons and the warrantor's intentions, must be reported
to the consumer. The consumer must also be informed of his right to pursue legal remedies if he
remains dissatisfied. If the warrantor has agreed to take action in accordance with any informal
decision, the mechanism must ascertain within five working days of the date specified for
performance whether the warrantor has in fact complied. Records must be maintained and
statistics must be compiled reflecting the disposition of all cases, The records relating to a
particular dispute must be available to both parties, and the statistical data must be open to the
public. All records must also be available to the FTC, and there must be an annual independent
audit of the operations. The report of the auditors must be sent to the Commission and made
available to the public. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,896-99 (July 16, 1975).
95. The limited resources of the Commission were evidently a factor in prompting the
Congress to permit direct judicial as well as administrative review of the adequacy of informal
procedures. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 26.
96. Id.
97. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,896 (July 16, 1975).
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warrantor must spell out the exact details of the procedure, or may
simply state that resort to an established settlement mechanism is
required.9 8 This may be one of the few instances in which the
Commission's authority to devise "canned" warranty provisions might
profitably be employed. 99 The details of model settlement mechanisms
could be spelled out by the FTC, and warrantors could then incorpo-
rate these provisions by reference. Incorporation by reference would be
less objectionable here than in connection with other types of "canned"
provisions, since the consumer need not be overly concerned with the
precise details of the informal procedure in view of the fact that the
Commission itself is charged with insuring its fairness.
Section 110(a)(3) prohibits a consumer from bringing a prior civil
action under subsection (d) if the warrantor has established an informal
settlement mechanism and required initial resort to it. 100 Since section
11 1(b)(1) preserves the consumer's rights and remedies under state law,
he is not prohibited from commencing a civil action for breach of
warranty under the UCC whether or not the dispute has been
submitted for informal settlement. 10 ' Consumer class actions are ac-
corded special treatment. Such actions may be commenced under section
110(d) regardless of the existence of an informal settlement mechanism,
but may not proceed beyond a determination of the representative
capacity of the named plaintiffs in accordance with rule 23(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rationale for this exception is
obvious. Until a determination as to representative capacity has been
made, no one can legitimately submit to an informal mechanism on
behalf of the entire class. If all potential class members were required to
participate individually in the informal procedure, the result would be
98. The Commission's Proposed Minimum Standards Rule would require the disclosure of the
availability of the informal mechanism, the name, address or telephone number used to initiate
proceedings, a statement compelling initial resort to the procedure if the consumer so desires, and a
disclosure that initial resort cannot be required when the rights and remedies being pursued do not
arise under the Act. In addition, any time limitations imposed by the procedure and the type of
information which may be requested must also be disclosed. The actual working details of the
procedure need not be setforth in the warranty or accompanying materials, but must be available on
demand, and in any case must be sent automatically to any consumer involved in a dispute. 40 Fed.
Reg. 29,896-97 (July 16, 1975).
99. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
100. This applies to all civil actions brought under section I10(d), whether in federal or state
court.
101. 120 Cong. Rec. 21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Moss). Of course, if
the controlling state law required exhaustion of alternative procedures, the consumer would still
be compelled to submit to the informal mechanism before pursuing a civil action. Id. The
proposed minimum standards rule would require that a warranty containing a provision
compelling initial resort to an informal mechanism also contain a statement that the consumer
may pursue remedies not created by the Act without initially resorting to the procedure. See note
98 supra.
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the same type of waste and duplication at the informal level that the class
action device is designed to eliminate at the judicial level. In essence,
section 110(a)(3) simply extends the concept of the class action into the
area of informal settlement.
A requirement that the consumer initially resort to an informal
settlement mechanism can provide one of the methods through which
judicial review of the adequacy of the informal procedure can be
obtained. Since resort to such a procedure can be required only when it
complies with established FTC rules, the consumer may choose to
institute a civil action immediately and argue that the mechanism does
not in fact meet the Commission's requirements. If the court agrees, the
consumer will be permitted to maintain his action. The burden of proving
compliance would fall on the warrantor since he would be the party
seeking to invoke the section 1 10(a)(3) exhaustion requirement. 102 The
consumer is evidently not obligated to demand a prior FTC review of the
procedure under section 110(a)(4) before presenting the question to the
court. ' 0
3
An adverse decision arising from an informal proceeding does not
bar the consumer from instituting a later civil action. The results of the
informal mechanism, however, are admissible in any later action,
whether brought under section 110(d) or under the UCC. 10 4 Presumably
the consumer could move to exclude the earlier decision on the grounds
that the proceeding did not comply with FTC rules, thus providing
another mechanism for judicial scrutiny of informal procedures. 205
Section 110(d) provides for the recovery of damages resulting from
either a failure to comply with the Act itself, or from a failure to
perform any obligation arising under a written warranty, implied
warranty or service contract. Thus the subsection not only provides a
means of enforcing the disclosure and content regulations contained in
the Act, but also establishes a federal cause of action for breach of
warranty. Even a warrantor offering no written warranty at all is sub-
ject to suit under subsection (d) if he should breach an implied war-
ranty which has arisen under state law. 10 6 Only obligations found
on oral warranties are excluded from the scope of section 110(d). The
subsection does not specify the nature of the damages which the
102. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 26-27.
103. Id.
104. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,898 (July 16, 1975).
105. House Report, supra note 4, at 41; 120 Cong. Rec. 21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)
(remarks of Senator Moss).
106. The term "warrantor" includes those liable under implied as well as written warranties.
Warranty Act § 101(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(5) (Supp. 1, 1975). The existence of implied warranties is
determined by state law. Id. § 101(7), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(7) (Supp. 1, 1975).
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consumer may recover in a section 110(d) action. Presumably the con-
sumer may seek all damages resulting from the warrantor's failure
to comply with either the Act itself or with a written or implied
warranty, including damages relating to personal injury and other
consequential damages.t0 7 However, the warrantor's liability for these
latter damages will ordinarily be determined by state law in accor-
dance with section 111(b)(2).
An action under subsection (d) may be brought in either state or
federal court. In view of the federal jurisdictional requirements in
section 110(d)(3), the great bulk of such actions will undoubtedly be
heard in state courts.108 In order to establish federal jurisdiction each
individual claim must be at least twenty-five dollars and the entire
amount in controversy must be $50,000, and, if the action is a class
action, the number of named plaintiffs must be at least one hundred.
The three requirements are independent-all must be met in order to
establish jurisdiction.10 9 It should be noted that the third requirement
refers to the number of named plaintiffs rather than to the size of the
class itself. 110
Before a consumer may commence an action under subsection (d)
based upon an alleged failure to comply with any obligation arising
under a written or implied warranty, section 110(e) requires that the
warrantor be afforded an opportunity to cure. 11 In the case of a class
action, the action may not proceed beyond a determination of the
representative capacity of the named plaintiffs until such plaintiffs,
107. The jurisdictional requirements in section 110(d)(3) lend support to the argument that
damages due to personal injury and other consequential damages are recoverable in an action
under subsection (d). Section 110(d)(3)(B) states that the amount in controversy must equal at
least $50,000 in order to bring suit in federal court, and the language of subsection (d)(3)(C)
indicates that the draftsmen did not believe that all such suits would be class actions. If the
damages recoverable in a section 110(d) action were limited to the loss of the bargain, no
individual claim would be likely to approach the $50,000 figure.
108. The Report of the Senate Commerce Committee states: "Thus, for the most part, the
Federal rights created by title I of this bill will be enforced in State rather than Federal courts."
S. Rep. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1974).
109. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 27; House Report, supra note 4, at 42.
110. The draftsmen may have felt that individual consumers might attempt to use the liberal
federal class action rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) in an effort to obtain increased settlement leverage.
By requiring a large number of named plaintiffs, the draftsmen were perhaps attempting to
shield warrantors from the threat of class actions made by isolated consumers. Query, however,
whether the requirement is so severe as to reduce greatly the benefits offered by the class action
mechanism.
111. This requirement pertains only to actions based upon a failure to comply with warranty
obligations, and not to actions founded upon a failure to comply with the provisions of the Act,
though both types of actions are permitted by subsection (d). Since the latter would most likely
involve violations of warranty content or disclosure requirements, as opposed to product
nonconformity, an opportunity to cure would not be particularly meaningful.
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acting on behalf of the class, likewise offer the warrantor an oppor-
tunity to cure. The section 110(e) requirement does not apply, how-
ever, if the consumer has previously been forced to submit the dispute
to an informal settlement mechanism, since the informal procedure
itself offers the warrantor an opportunity to avoid suit by taking
corrective action.
The effect of section 1 10(f) is not entirely apparent. The subsection
states that only those warrantors "actually making" written affirma-
tions or promises shall be deemed to have created a written warranty.
Unfortunately, the term "actually making" is left undefined. At a
minimum the term would appear to exclude newspapers, magazines,
and radio or television stations which merely advertise a warranty on
behalf of another. 112 It would also appear to prohibit a suit under
section 110(d) against a designated service representative. This view is
supported by section 107 which specifically states that such a rep-
resentative does not become a co-warrantor. But does section 110(f)
reach beyond these examples? Is a retailer "actually making" an
affirmation or promise when he sells a product upon which the
manufacturer has fastened a written warranty? Before concluding that
the term is intended to exclude such persons, however, the language of
the House-Senate Conference Committee Report should be considered.
The report states:
[I]f under State law a warrantor or other person is deemed to have made a written
affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking he would be treated for purposes of
section 110 as having made such affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking.",
Thus, if under state law a retailer is liable on the written warranty
created by his manufacturer, he may be subject to suit under section
110(d) if he fails to comply with any warranty obligation." 4
The requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are not tied
exclusively to private enforcement. Under section 110(b), a failure to
comply with the requirements of the new statute constitutes a violation
of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act."15 This device
112. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 27.
113. Id.
114. The accepted rule is that a seller is not liable on the express warranty of the manufac-
turer unless he somehow "adopts" it as his own. E.g., Wallace v. McCampbell, 178 Tenn. 224,
156 S.W.2d 442 (1941) (merchant did not adopt manufacturer's alleged warranty by merely
delivering a letter in which it was described); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash.2d 348, 161 P.2d
305 (1945) (mere selling of product held not sufficient to show adoption of manufacturer's
warranty by seller); see Scovil v. Chilcoat, 424 P.2d 87 (Okla. 1967) (affirmation or promise by seller
which relates to manufacturer's warranty constitutes an adoption). This general rule, however, has
not been without criticism. R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the UCC
§ 6.08(2) (1975); 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 19.04(6) (1975).
115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(aX1) (Supp. 1, 1975). This section states: "Unfair methods of competi-
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gives the FTC the power to issue cease and desist orders in connection
with such violations. In addition, section 110(c) grants to both the
Commission and the Department of Justice the power to seek injunc-
tive relief in federal court. In a proper case, temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions may be issued. If the action is
brought by the Commission, the restraining order or preliminary
injunction will be dissolved if a complaint is not filed under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act within ten days or such shorter period
as the court may specify. An injunction may be directed at a warrantor
who offers a "deceptive warranty," or who fails to comply with any
obligation imposed by the Act. The term "deceptive warranty" is defined
in section 1 10(c)(2) of the Warranty Act as one which contains a false or
misleading representation, or fails to disclose information necessary to
prevent the warranty from being misleading. 116 A warranty is also
"deceptive" if it is so limited in scope as to be in reality no warranty at all.
In connection with the first portion of the definition the draftsmen chose
as the standard a "reasonable individual exercising due care." As to the
latter portion, however, the standard is based simply on a "reasonable
individual," the "due care" language having been omitted. Whatever the
legislative intent, the standards will almost certainly be indistinguishable
in practice.117
The Congress was well aware that it faced something less
than a clean slate when it confronted the problems of consumer
product warranties. Section 111 attempts to delineate the extent to
which the Act affects the complex pattern of existing state and federal
law. Subsection (c), which relates to state disclosure and labeling
requirements, and the interpretive problems which it generates, has
already been discussed in connection with section 102. As previously
noted, section 111 (b)(1) preserves private rights and remedies under
state and other federal law. The consumer is thus free to ignore the Act
and seek redress through more traditional avenues such as breach of
warranty, fraud, or rescission. I"8 The deference paid by section 11 l(b)(2)
tion in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful."
116. The FTC will evidently treat any written warranty which contains a disclaimer,
exclusion or limitation which is in violation of the Act as a "deceptive warranty" under section
110(c), presumably because such a provision may induce the consumer to forego recourse to the
warranty in situations where he may in fact have enforceable legal rights. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,723
(June 18, 1975).
117. Sections 102(aX13) and 102(b)(1)(B), which are intended to prevent deception arising
through inadequate disclosure, employ the standard of a "reasonable, average consumer." The
distinction between this standard and that established by section 110(c)(2) is left to the inventive
skill of the reader.
118. Section 111(b)(1) would also preserve consumer remedies under federal statutes such as
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. II, 1972).
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to state laws regulating liability for personal injury and consequential
damages has also been considered. In addition, section 111(a) serves as
a reminder that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
continues to apply to practices associated with consumer product
warranties whether or not they are covered by the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act. Thus warranties which are not within the scope of the
Act remain within the mandate of the FTC. 119 Finally, with the
exception of the section 102(c) tying prohibition, section 111(d) renders
the Act inapplicable to written warranties otherwise governed by
federal law, such as section 207 of the Clean Air Act, 120 which pertains to
warranties on motor vehicles.
VI. CONCLUSION
The degree to which the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act will be
successful in eliminating the abuses documented by the Task Force on
Appliance Warranties and Service is uncertain. The exact scope of the
Act is vague and ill-defined, and its relationship to existing state law
remains perplexing despite protracted efforts at explication. In view of
the extended consideration afforded by Congress, the number of
ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies is surprising. In addition,
since the Act does not compel the use of written warranties or require
that all those offered meet the "full" warranty standards of section 104,
the whole enterprise must rely heavily upon competitive pressure.
Success is possible only if economic forces are sufficient both to
dissuade manufacturers and retailers from reducing their use of written
warranties in the face of tightened controls and to spur the
abandonment of "limited" warranties in favor of the more extensive
"full" warranty coverage. In the end, however, the combination of
toughened disclosure standards, increased regulation of warranty
content, and improved remedial mechanisms may adequately over-
come the shortcomings of the Act and thus at least partially reduce the
incidence of unfairness and deception arising in connection with the
use of consumer product warranties.
119. This would include, for example, warranties on products costing less than five dollars. S.
Rep. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1974).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(0-5(a) (1970).
